How to Discern Nuclear Decision Making Variables

My article discusses variables that affect nuclear decision making. This article will help readers to understand how proliferation, deterrents and various war fighting variables affect the nuclear decision making process.

Instructions

1. While any nation with a large number of nuclear bombs clearly poses a severe threat in cases where sanity deficiencies are prevalent, there are many variables that will facilitate the same threats upon the acquisition and or development of a seemingly insignificant amount of nuclear bombs.

2. Competitor Nation Tendencies
   Although it is not a popular notion to entertain, we must remain cognizant of the fact that basic competitor nation tendencies will make it very difficult to prevent these types of nations from embarking on a course that will lead to proliferation on a nominal yet functional level at the least. We must understand these facts because they can cause nations to willingly or unwillingly become a catalyst for potentially dangerous examples of proliferation in regards to any participatory role that involves a terrorist or rogue type of enemy nation.

3. Enemy Nation Tendencies
   The domestic and foreign policy interests of enemy nations are ill intentioned and diametrically opposed to peace and stability on a regional and global specific basis, therefore, it is imperative that we understand and make bold attempts to decisively defeat and deter such nations from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. To do this, one must understand the differences between an enemy and competitor nation. Understanding these differences will often play a pivotal role in determining how successful a socially responsible nation will be in preventing disaster.

4. Rogue/Terrorist Tendencies
   This is the third part of the social triumvirate that dictates strategic policy by way of theater occurrences across the globe. In fact, today, this part of the social triumvirate may be the most influential part, as it has become a proxy war subordinate element of both enemy and competitor nations. The Iran/China/Russia alliance is a perfect example of this type of unholy alliance. Also, while Pakistan is perceived as an ally of America, Pakistan's status as the first Islamic fundamentalist nation to acquire a nuclear weapon's capability has established a paradigm that has exacerbated the tendencies of rogue/terrorist nations and organizations in regards to their nuclear goals and interests. Should Iran become successful in acquiring nuclear weapons through their strategic alliance with China and Russia, fundamentalist Middle Eastern nations will soon choose Iran as a viable alternative to forging an alliance with a Western supported Pakistan.

5. Proliferation among rogue and terrorist nation states can potentially deter and or decisively defeat western interests in strategic areas across the globe without matching the West weapon for weapon. Once again, using Iran and Pakistan as models, we could easily have a scenario where a nation with a well functioning arsenal of over 48 nuclear weapons could be neutralized by an Iranian nation with only a few nuclear weapons. This scenario is based on the assumption that Iran is able to exercise paradigm continuity in becoming the second Islamic fundamentalist nation to acquire nuclear weapons. This assumption is not far fetched, as Iran is believed to be capable of acquiring nuclear weapons within three years.